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NJ
Divorce Article
EVIDENTIAL STANDARDS OF CUSTODY & TIMESHARING
REPORTS: Are Reliability and Validity Standards Taking a Back Seat?
By:
Charles F. Vuotto, Jr., Esq.
and
Lisa B. Steirman, Esq.
As the Family
Part Courts of our state struggle to handle mounting dockets, they continue
to place greater weight on the custody/timesharing recommendations of expert
mental health professionals. As a result, there is growing concern among
the legal community that the legal standards of evidentiary reliability are
being eclipsed by the court’s deference to the mental health expert’s
opinion. The result of such deference is a highly disconcerting situation
wherein the best interests of a child is decided not by the court after
careful consideration of all relevant law and evidence in a particular case,
but rather decided based on the court’s adoption of an expert’s opinion that
may lack sufficient legal and empirical support. Unfortunately, it is the
child who may be harmed under these circumstances.
It is the position of the authors that it is the responsibility of both
bench and bar to ensure that mental health experts are held to the same
evidentiary standards that apply to all experts pursuant to the law of our
state. As will be addressed in detail below, once the appropriate
evidentiary standards are applied, it is evident that mental health
professionals are not legally authorized to make ultimate recommendations as
to what custody/timesharing arrangement is in the best interest of a child.
However, mental health professionals can play a critical role in offering a
court vital information upon which a court can rely in reaching its final
custody/parenting time determination based upon statutory criteria. This
article will attempt to provide the basic evidentiary standards to be
applied in the context of child custody litigation, outline how the
techniques and tests employed by mental health experts often fail to meet
those standards, and ultimately offer recommendations to help guarantee that
a mental health expert’s testimony is admissible in a custody litigation
A BRIEF SYNOPSIS OF
NEW JERSEY LAW GOVERNING THE ADMISSION OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Rule 702 of the New Jersey Rules of Evidence governs the
admissibility of expert testimony and provides:
If
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier
of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Rule 702.
When determining the admissibility of expert testimony in New Jersey, the
evidentiary test established in the 1993 case of Frye v. United States[1]
(hereinafter referred to as the Frye Test) remains the appropriate
evidentiary standard in most cases wherein the admission of scientific
evidence is at issue.[2]
In Frye, the Court established what is commonly referred to as the
“general acceptance standard,” which requires that scientific testimony is
only admissible if it is based on a scientific technique that is generally
accepted in the relevant scientific community.[3]
The Supreme
Court of New Jersey has declared that general acceptance under the Frye test
“entails
the strict application of the scientific method, which requires an
extraordinarily high level of proof based on prolonged, controlled,
consistent, and validated experience.”[4]
Moreover, the inquiry into general acceptance does not only require a
finding that the scientific technique or procedure is generally utilized in
the particular scientific profession, but further requires that “the
scientific technique or procedure be accepted as scientifically reliable”
within the profession.[5]
New Jersey courts have interpreted the Frye
Tests as requiring that the general acceptance of scientific evidence may be
demonstrated in three specific ways: “(1) by expert testimony as to the
general acceptance, among those in the profession, of the premises on which
the proffered expert witness based his or her analysis; (2) by authoritative
scientific and legal writings indicating that the scientific community
accepts the premises underlying the proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial
opinions that indicate the expert’s premises have gained general
acceptance.”[6]
Subsequent to
Frye, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected the Frye test as
an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.[7]
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Court abandoned
the Frye “general acceptance” test in favor of a more relaxed standard.
Specifically, the Daubert Court held that scientific expert testimony
was admissible even in situations where general acceptance could not be
proven so long as the court could determine that the testimony had
evidentiary reliability and relevance. In reaching a determination as to
evidentiary reliability, the Court may examine such factors as whether the
theory or technique has been tested, peer review, error rates, and
acceptability in the relevant scientific community.[8]
With limited
exceptions,[9]
the more relaxed Federal evidentiary principles established in Daubert
have not been adopted by the courts of New Jersey, who continue to apply the
Frye test when determining the admissibility of scientific evidence.[10]
Indeed the Frye test has been specifically applied by New Jersey courts to
expert testimony concerning behavioral science.
[11]
WHY MENTAL
HEALTH EXPERTS ARE FAILING TO MEET EVIDENTIARY STANDARDS
The
professional discipline of psychology is grounded in the principle that
conclusions regarding human behavior can be drawn from scientific evidence
and tested via scientific method.[12]
Pursuant to the Frye test, the expert opinion of mental health professionals
must be derived from scientific data that is generally accepted in the
scientific community as reliable and valid in order to be admissible in a
courtroom. Unfortunately, child custody/timesharing expert testimony has
faced increasing criticism due to the “lack of scientific methodology,
empirical grounding, and psychological relevance” employed in reaching
conclusions and rendering reports.[13]
Predictions as to the Best Interests of a
Child
The most glaring
overreaching of mental health professionals undoubtedly occurs when a mental
health expert gives the court an ultimate recommendation as to what
custodial/timesharing arrangement is in the best interests of a particular
child. Such a recommendation cannot possibly pass the scrutiny of the Frye
test as there is a patent absence of empirical data to support that
recommendation.[14]
Indeed, there exists no validated psychological test that either assesses
parenting directly or empirically supports a decisive determination
concerning the appropriate custodial arrangement for a particular child.[15]
Interviews
The major
concerns surrounding the mental health expert’s interviewing of parents or
children focus on “problems of reliability and relevance.”[16]
Specifically, criticisms surrounding a lack of reliability in the interview
process cite the mental health expert’s gathering of interview data that is
“subjective, partial, or unscientific in manner.”[17]
Frequently raised is the issue of “confirmatory bias,” which results when a
mental health expert seeks out information that verifies his or her
predetermined theory, to the exclusion of all other information that is
contrary to that theory.[18]
Relevancy problems frequently arise in the context of a mental health
expert’s interview when the mental health expert “fails to address the
pending psycholegal issue of comparative parenting capacity.”[19]
Indeed, a mental health expert’s focus on identifying psychopathology in a
particular parent is only relevant if there is reliable empirical data to
support a linkage between the specific pathology identified and parental
fitness.[20]
Psychological Testing
Objective Adult Personality Tests: MMPI and
MCMI
The MMPI (Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory) is undoubtedly the
most frequently employed objective adult personality test found in
custody/timesharing evaluations.[21]
The MMPI was not developed to determine parenting abilities, but was rather
developed to screen for severe pathology. The test consists of a lengthy
series of true or false questions. The test “is based on the assumption
that people who answer the test questions in a manner similar to members of
a particular group are likely to behave in ways similar to members of that
group.”[22]
The scant research that has been performed relating to the connection
between an individual’s MMPI result and the behavior and adjustment of that
individual’s child “suggest a complex and inconsistent association between
MMPI profiles of parents and their children’s behavior or pathology.”[23]
There exists no single MMPI profile that is capable of identifying an
individual as a ‘good’ or ‘bad’ parent. Although the “MMPI may provide
reliable information about parents’ psychopathology and emotional
functioning,” the MMPI “contains no scale to predict what custodial
arrangements will further the best interest of a child.”[24]
Given the widespread application of the MMPI in custody/timesharing
evaluations, the dearth of case law questioning the reliability and
relevance of the test in custody evaluations is disconcerting.[25]
The MCMI (Millon Clinical Multiaxial Inventory) is the second most popular
adult personality test utilized in custody/parenting time evaluations.
Containing a series of true or false questions, the MCMI is intended to
evaluate personality disorders based on Theodore Millon’s theory of
personality, “which posits three polarities to explain behavior:
pain-pleasure, self-other, and active-passive.”[26]
Those who criticize the use of the test stress that since the MCMI
was developed on clinical populations, the test is skewed toward findings of
pathology in the subject individual. “Accordingly, it is not surprising
that [the MCMI’s] critics claim that it is inaccurate in child custody
disputes and makes parents appear more pathological then they likely are.”[27]
Also, just as with the MMPI, there is widespread criticism that the MCMI
lacks the scientific validity necessary to defend its use in a custody
evaluation.[28]
It is crucial to be aware that “no personality tests measure parenting
competency, nor has any constellation of personality traits been linked to
skill as caregiver.”[29]
Therefore, “[i]t is impossible to determine from test results alone if a
parent’s measured response patterns are related, either directly or
indirectly, to parenting competencies.”[30]
If this is true, then how can custody and parenting time conclusions
premised on these tests pass the Frye Test?
Projective
Techniques: Rorschach Inkblot and Thematic Apperception Test
The Rorschach is the most frequently employed projective technique found in
custody/timesharing evaluations. The Rorschach technique involves
ambiguously shaped inkblot drawings that are shown to the subject individual
who is then asked what he or she sees. Based on the individual’s answer, a
projection of the subject’s psychopathology and personality is determined.[31]
There is much debate surrounding the general reliability of the Rorschach
technique within the scientific community. These general concerns of
reliability are further compounded when the test is used in the setting of
custody litigation since “[n]o studies correlate personality attributes
identified by Rorschach with good parenting…”[32]
Despite this lack of empirical support, there is an absence of case law
questioning the admissibility of the Rorschach test in custody litigation.
“In contrast with the vigorous debate about the relevance and reliability of
the Rorschach in child custody evaluations that has taken place in the
scientific community, the legal system has largely ignored these criticisms
in admitting the Rorschach in child custody evaluations.”[33]
The TAT is another projective technique that involves 31 cards reflecting
drawings of people in ambiguous situations. The subject individual is asked
to tell a story concerning what is happening in each of the drawings. The
most common method of interpretation of the individual’s response is
“informal and relies on the examiner’s subjective impressions.”[34]
Common criticism of the test include “inadequate and empirically unsupported
norms for scoring and unimpressive incremental validity.”[35]
With specific regard to use of the TAT in custodial litigation,
“[p]rojective measures have not been shown to have the requisite
psychometric properties to render them reliable or valid for predicting
custodial functioning.”[36]
Succinctly stated, “no empirical behavioral science literature exists
demonstrating that projective drawings are related to any specific element
of a parent-child relationship, or are predictive of any particular
parenting practices or developmental outcomes.”[37]
Therefore, commentators have noted that it “constitutes poor professional
practice for an evaluator to render psycholegal conclusions about adult
personality structure and psychological functioning on the basis of
projective drawings.”[38]
As one commentator eloquently noted:
It is
difficult to reconcile the legal system’s largely unquestioned acceptance of
the Rorschach and the TAT with the fervor of the scientific community’s
criticisms of the tests’ reliability and their reliability in custody
evaluations. How can the law be a critical consumer of mental health
practitioner expertise if it ignores the scientific community’s critiques of
proffered expert testimony and fails to apply discriminating threshold
standards for the admissibility of expert evidence derived from these tests?[39]
Custody Specific
Tests: Bricklin and Ackerman Schoendorf Scales
Recently, tests
have been created that are specifically designed to assess children during
custody evaluations[40].
Three distinct types of Bricklin tests include the Bricklin Perceptual
Scales (BPS), the Perception of Relationships Test (PORT) and the Parent
Awareness Skills Survey (PASS). The BPS tests contains 64 questions which
ask for a subject child’s rating of his or her parents’ functioning.[41]
Based on the child’s answers, a score is created that reflects the child’s
“perception of their parents’ competence, supportiveness, consistency,
admirableness.”[42]
The parent who receives the highest scores is regarded as the parent of
choice for custody. The PORT is a projective test wherein a child is asked
to perform specific tasks that include drawing each parent, drawing him or
herself, drawing a family, and completing stories concerning the family’s
conflict. The results of the tasks are then scored to determine which
parent is the primary caretaker of the subject child.[43]
The PASS measures the parents’ “awareness of social issues, ability to
explore solutions, and acknowledgment of children’s behavior.”[44]
The PASS “consists of 18 typical child care situations or dilemmas and
represents a sampling of relevant parenting behaviors that can be applied to
children of various ages.”[45]
Parents are asked how they would respond to each situation. The test
“appears to be rooted in the commonsense notion that strengths and
weaknesses in parents’ child-rearing abilities can be assessed, in part, by
querying parents about how they would respond to various child care
scenarios.”[46]
The amount of
criticism surrounding the Bricklin tests is impressive; nonetheless, family
courts place no limits on the admissibility of these tests. Critics of the
Bricklin tests note “test developers do not provide validity data and that
the scales are conceptually flawed and seek to measure constructs that are
not empirically testable…”[47]
Critics emphasize that the methodology behind the test is flawed,
asserting that “[t]he measures contain unrealistic or untested
assumptions…developed on inappropriately small, inadequately described, or
inappropriate clinical samples, lack adequate reliability and validity…”[48]
Moreover, there is a blatant absence of published studies that confirm the
validity of these tests.[49]
The Ackerman-Schoendorf
Scales (“ASPECT”) were designed to determine parental fitness. The ASPECT
includes interviews of parents and children, a parent questionnaire, and
numerous projective and objective tests. Based on the cumulative data from
these sources, three standardized scales are developed, namely the “(1)
observational scale: quality of parents’ appearance in the evaluation; (2)
social scale: social and intra-familial relationships, and (3) cognitive
emotional scale: emotional and cognitive parenting abilities.”[50]
These three scales are then applied to determine a “parental custody index”
that measures parental fitness.[51]
Just as with the
Bricklin scales, there is much criticism surrounding the ASPECT test that
focuses on a lack of validity and methodologically sound published research.[52]
Critics note that the “The ASPECT needs more normative, reliability, and
validity data before one can conclude that it fulfills its promise of being
a practical, objective, and standardized approach to child custody
evaluations.”[53]
PROPOSED GUIDELINES TO ENSURE EVIDENTIARY ADMISSIBILITY
Although adherence to the evidentiary standards of our state
renders the ultimate custody/timesharing recommendations of a mental health
expert inadmissible, the mental health expert can be crucial in providing
the court with empirically sound data concerning individual and family
functioning that will assist the court in reaching a decision as to what
custodial/timesharing arrangement is in the best interests of a child.[54]
It is when the expert’s conclusion exceeds that which can be gleaned from a
scientific technique generally accepted in the relevant scientific community
that evidential standards are violated. The following are suggestions
offered by the authors and intended to aid in ensuring that the expert
testimony of the mental health expert meets the required evidentiary
standards:
1.
The Mental Health Expert Must
Acknowledge the Limitations of His Expert Opinion as They Relate to the
Ultimate Question of What Custodial Arrangement is in the Best Interests of
a Child. In order for a mental health expert’s testimony to be
admissible in the context of a child custody/parenting time dispute, it is
crucial that the mental health expert acknowledge the
limitations of the scientific data
employed. The mental health expert must acknowledge that his or her
ultimate recommendation as to what custody/timesharing arrangement is in the
best interests of a particular child cannot withstand a Frye test
application. Especially in the area of psychological testing, it is crucial
to emphasize that frequent utilization of a test is not sufficient to
demonstrate ‘general acceptance’ under the Frey test.
The inquiry into
general acceptance further requires that “the scientific technique or
procedure be accepted as scientifically reliable” within the profession.[55]
Therefore, as demonstrated above, although
certain scientific methods and tests are commonly employed in child
custody/timesharing evaluations, these tests cannot withstand a Frye test
application since these tests have not proven themselves “scientifically
reliable” in the context of determining ultimate custody/timesharing
recommendations for a particular child.
2.
The Mental Health Expert’s Testimony
Must Meet the Standards of the Frye Test. Although empirically
insufficient to support an ultimate finding concerning what custodial
relationship is in the best interests of a child, mental health experts can
offer invaluable information to the court concerning child development and
family dynamics. Such information can play a critical role in aiding the
court in reaching its determination as to what custodial arrangement is in
the best interests of a child.[56]
However, it is critical that all information provided by the mental health
expert withstand a Frye test inquiry. In order to meet the evidentiary
requirements of the Frye test, admissibility must be demonstrated “(1) by
expert testimony as to the general acceptance, among those in the
profession, of the premises on which the proffered expert witness based his
or her analysis; (2) by authoritative scientific and legal writings
indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the
proffered testimony; and (3) by judicial opinions that indicate the expert’s
premises have gained general acceptance.“[57]
Since case law is devoid of any judicial findings as to the general
acceptance of the psychological methods and tests at issue in a custody
evaluation, it is crucial for the mental health expert to address whether
the scientific technique or procedure is accepted
as scientifically reliable within the profession for the exact purpose that
it is being employed by the expert. Moreover, the mental health
expert should be prepared to demonstrate that the particular method or
procedure is the subject of “authoritative scientific and legal writings
indicating that the scientific community accepts the premises underlying the
proffered testimony.”[58]
3.
The information proffered by the
mental health expert must be relevant to the specific issue raised in a
particular litigation. In order for any expert testimony to be
admissible, it must be directly relevant to the issue presented to the
court.[59]
Rather than simply requesting that a mental health expert perform a general
‘custody evaluation,’ the court and respective counsel in a given case
should construct case-specific issues to be addressed by the mental health
expert (i.e., drug abuse, overly harsh discipine, etc.).[60]
Adherence to these specific areas of concern will help diminish the mental
health expert’s use of irrelevant findings and diagnosis that serve to
unduly complicate and even prejudice the expert’s testimony[61].
Conclusion
The testimony of mental health experts must be held to the strict standards
of evidence that have become the hallmark of our legal system. Without
strict adherence to these evidentiary standards, the critical question
concerning what is in the best interests of a child will continue to be
decided by a mental health expert’s testimony that may be plagued with
personal value judgments and non-scientific speculations, rather than by a
court after careful consideration of the law (i.e., statutory custody
factors and decisional law) and empirically sound data. If the foregoing
suggestions are employed by the mental health expert, bench and bar, we can
ensure that the mental health expert is available to offer invaluable data
to the court, while simultaneously limiting such information to
“empirically-based psychological testimony that represents and reflects the
highest standards of the scientific study of human behavior.”[62]
Mr. Vuotto is a
shareholder with Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer, certified by the Supreme Court
of the State of New Jersey as a Matrimonial Law Attorney and is a member of the
Executive Committee of the New Jersey State Bar Association’s Family Law
Section.
Ms. Steirman was an
associate with Wilentz, Goldman & Spitzer.
[1]Frye
v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923)
[2]
Richard J. Biunno, New Jersey Rules of Evidence, 2005 Ed.,
Comment to Rule 702[3], page 847.
[3]
Frye, 293 F. at 1014.
[4]
Rubanick v. Witco Chemical Corp., 125 N.J. 421, 436
(1991).
[5]
Magaw v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 323 N.J. Super. 1,
14-15 (App. Div. 1999), certif. den. 162 N.J. 485 (1999).
[6]
State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 170 (1997) (quoting
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 (1984)).
[7]
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S.
579 (1993).
[9]
Two exceptions to the Court’s application of the Frye rule
include tort cases involving injuries caused by a drug or toxic
substance (see Kemp ex rel. v.Wright v. State, 174
N.J. 412 (2002)), and death penalty hearings wherein the defense
offers scientific evidence (see State v. Davis, 96
N.J. 611 (1984)).
[10]
In Re Commitment of R.S., 339 N.J. Super. 507, 536
(App. Div. 2001) (noting that “New Jersey has long recognized that
in order to be admitted into evidence, a novel scientific test must
meet the standard articulated in Frye v. United States…,” and
further recognizing, “Although Frye has been replaced in the federal
court system by the more lenient standards of Federal Rule of
Evidence 702 as set forth in Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., in New Jersey, with the exception of
toxic tort litigation, Frye remains the standard.”) (citations
omitted).
[11]
Id. at 535 (“Although the expert testimony at issue involves
behavioral science, which is concededly subjective and less tangible
than the techniques of physical science, our Court has applied the
same test as to its admissibility.”) (citations omitted).
[12]
Timothy M. Tippins, “Part IX: Babies, Bathwater and ‘Daubert’,”
New York Law Journal, Nov. 5, 2004. (“The most notorious
species of overreaching testimony is the utterance of a specific
conclusion about what is or is not in the best interests of a given
child within a particular family, a conclusion for which there is
simply insufficient empirical support.”)
[13]
Dana Royce Baerger; Robert Galatzer-Levy, Jonathan W. Gould, Sandra
G. Nye, “A Methodology For Reviewing The Reliability and Relevance
of Child Custody Evaluations,” 18 J. Am. Acad. Matrim. Law. 35, 26
(2002) (“Unfortunately, CCEs frequently fall below professional
forensic practice standards. Commentators have criticized the
quality, reliability, and utility of CCEs by noting the lack of
scientific methodology, empirical grounding, and psycholegal
relevance common among these reports.”)
[14]
Daniel W. Shuman, “What Should We Permit Mental Health Professionals
to Say About ‘The Best Interests of the Child’?: An Essay on Common
Sense, Daubert, and the Rules of Evidence”, 31 Fam. L.Q. 551,
567 (1997) (“To assess the ability of mental health professionals
to make accurate predictions requires the outcome (i.e., the best
interests of the child) be ’operationalized,’ or described in a
fashion capable of measurement to test the validity and reliability
of these predictions. Since the best interests standard is by
definition indeterminate, it is incapable of measuring a mental
health professional’s ability to predict outcomes. Apart from the
problem of defining best interests so that predicted outcomes can be
operationalized and tested, research on the predictive abilities of
mental health professionals does not support claims of omnipotence
about the best interests of the child.’)
[15]
Daniel W. Shuman, “The Role of Mental Health Experts In Custody
Decisions: Science, Psychological Tests, and Clinical Judgment,” 36
Fam. L.Q. 135, 144 (2002) (“Accordingly, those who have
reviewed literature conclude that there are no psychological tests
that have been validated to assess parenting directly. Given the
advances of science, this finding may seem counterintuitive.”)
[16]
Dona Royce Baerger, Robert Galatzer-Levy; Jonathon W. Gould; Sandra
G. Nye, supra note 13, at 55.
[18]
Id. at 55. (“Confirmatory bias can significantly distort the
reliability and utility (’validity’) of interview data, and can lead
the evaluator to inaccurate or one-sided conclusions unsupported by
other evidence.”)
[19]
Id. at 57 (“One example of a relevance problem is the use of
a traditional ‘clinical interview’ in the context of a [child
custody evaluation]. The primary purpose of a clinical or
diagnostic interview is the identification of intervention or
treatment methods most likely to facilitate the subject’s recovery.
Unless the court will evaluate an issue regarding a parent’s
diagnostic status or psychological well-being, clinical data
regarding psychopathology is not relevant to the pending legal
issue. Child custody evaluators who engage in traditional clinical
interviewing are not only likely to fail to adequately address the
pending legal issue, but are also on a ‘fishing expedition’ for
psychopathology that can lead them astray from the court’s need for
reliable and relevant information.”)
[20]
Timothy M. Tippins, supra note 12.
[21]Randy
K. Otto; John F. Edens; Elizabeth H. Barcus, “The Use of
Psychological Testing in Child Custody Evaluations,” 38 Fam. &
Conciliation Courts Rev. 312, 315 (2000).
[22]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 144-45.
[23]
Id. at 145 (citing Randy K. Otto, Robert P Collins,
“Use of the MMPI-2/MMPI-A in Child Custody Evaluations,” Forensic
Applications of the MMPI-2, 233, 234 (Yoseef-Ben Porath et. al.
ed. 1995).
[24]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 145.
[25]Id.
at 146 (citing Tipton v. Marion Co. Dept. of Pub. Welfare,
629 N.E.2d 1262, 1268 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (use of MMPI to
support termination of parent-child relationship reversed in the
absence of attempt to validate the test results by examining the
behavior of the person tested but test affirmed as to findings
concerning depression, anxiety, and poor impulse control to suggest
an inability to parent); In re Marriage of Luckey, 868
P.2d. 189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994) (use of MMPI to determine that
father was a child molester questioned.)).
[26]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 146.
[29]
Dana Royce Baerger, Robert Galatzer-Levy; Jonathon W. Gould; Sandra
G. Nye, supra note 13, at 60.
[31]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 147.
[36]
Id. at 149 (citing Lois A. Weithorn & Thomas
Grisso, “Psychological Evaluations in Divorce Custody: Problems,
Principles, and Procedures, Psychology and Child Custody
Determinations: Knowledge, Roles and Expertise (Lois A. Weithorn
ed. 1987)).
[37]Dana
Royce Baerger; Robert Galatzer-Levy, Jonathan W. Gould, Sandra G.
Nye, Robert Galatzer-Levy; Jonathon W. Gould, supra note 13,
at 62-63, 2002.
[38]
Dana Royce Baerger; Robert Galatzer-Levy, Jonathan W. Gould, Sandra
G. Nye, Robert Galatzer-Levy; Jonathon W. Gould, supra note
13, at 63, 2002.
[39]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 150.
[40]
Randy K. Otto; John F. Edens; Elizabeth H. Barcus, supra note
21, at 314.
[41]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 150.
[45]
Randy K. Otto; John F. Edens; Elizabeth H. Barcus, supra note
21, at 329.
[47]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 151.
[50]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15 at 152.
[52]
Randy K. Otto; John F. Edens; Elizabeth H. Barcus, supra note
21, at 330 (“No research regarding the ASPECT has been published in
peer-reviewed journals.”). Several commentators have emphasized the
fact that designers of both the ASPECT and the BPS attempt to
validate these tests by demonstrating a direct correlation between
the test results and judicial decisions. Id. at
331. Of course, use of such a connection in determining the
validity of these tests is somewhat absurd. As one commentator
noted, “If the measure of good expert opinion is the ability to
replicate judicial decision-making, what justifies the use of
experts? If mental health experts are needed because the legal
system is solely inadequate to decide custody cases correctly, what
does the ability of a test to predict a judge’s decision say about
what is in the best interests of a child?” Daniel W. Shuman,
supra, note 15, at 152.
[53]
Daniel W. Shuman, supra note 15, at 152 (quoting Michaela C.
Heinze & Thomas Grisso, “Review of Instruments Assessing Parenting
Competencies Used in Child Custody Evaluations,” 14 BEHAV. SCI. &
L., 294, 296 (1999)).
[54]
Timothy M. Tippins, supra note 12 (“Empirical studies
elucidating relevant aspects of parent-child relationships as they
relate to child developmental outcomes do exist, even if they can’t
support an opinion on the final question of best interest.
Empirical data relative to family dynamics, such as the impact of
parental substance abuse and domestic violence on children, as well
as the ‘bi-directional nature of the parent-child relationship,’ can
assist the court in assessing the custodial question, even though
stopping short of suggesting a prescriptive conclusion.”).
[55]
Magaw v. Middletown Bd. of Educ., 323 N.J. Super. 1, 14-15
(App. Div. 1999), certif. den. 162 N.J. 485 (1999).
[56]
Timothy M. Tippins, supra note 12 (“To summarily exclude all
forensic testimony because the psychology discipline lacks an
empirically derived answer to the best interests question would
ignore the growing body of empirical data that sheds light on
important aspects of child development and family dynamics, a body
of knowledge that is still in its infancy and still emerging.”)
[57]
State v. Harvey, 151 N.J. 117, 170 (1997) (quoting
State v. Kelly, 97 N.J. 178, 210 (1984)).
[58]
With specific regard to psychological testing in the context of a
custody evaluation, one commentator sets forth the following
questions that mental health professionals should ask themselves
before employing a test: “Is the test commercially published?...Is
a comprehensive test manual available?…Are adequate levels of
reliability demonstrated?…Have adequate levels of validity been
demonstrated?…Is the test valid for the purpose in which it will be
used?…Has the instrument been peer reviewed?…What are the
qualifications necessary to use this instrument?” Randy K. Otto;
John F. Edens; Elizabeth H. Barcus, supra note 21, at
333-35.
[59]
Richard J. Biunno, New Jersey Rules of Evidence, 2005 Ed.,
comment 702[1], pg. 829 (“Obviously, the trier of fact can be
assisted only in areas that are relevant to its deliberations.”)
[60]
Dana Royce Baerger, Robert Galatzer-Levy; Jonathon W. Gould; Sandra
G. Nye, supra note 13, at 51 (“Judges and attorneys can
greatly increase the utility of evaluations by crafting court orders
that pose referral questions specific to each family. This practice
increases the likelihood that evaluators will address matters of
central importance to the litigation, and diminishes the likelihood
that evaluators will address irrelevant issues that confuse the
litigation and increase the cost of the evaluation.”)
[61]Id.
at 52 (“A particularly problematic situation can arise when an
evaluator offers opinions about issues that are both irrelevant to
the pending legal issue and highly prejudicial…Placing a child in
the primary custodial care of a parent suffering from “Generalized
Anxiety Disorder and Personality Disorder Not Otherwise Specified,
with avoidant and obsessive-compulsive features” sounds almost
negligent – despite the fact that this diagnosis may have nothing
whatever to do with caregiving capacity.”)
[62]
Timothy M. Tippins, supra note 12.
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